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INTRODUCTION

With the advent of Project Capstone' in 1980, the United
1. Project Capstone was developed by the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) as a comprehensive training program in order to optimally align Active
Army and Reserve Component units to meet European wartime requirements
and to satisfy the post-mobilization needs of continental United States military
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States Army adopted a master European war plan which committed virtually every Army National Guard and Army Reserve unit
to a large-scale field army for use in the European Theater of Operations. The plan was designed to combat a hypothetical offensive by tank-heavy Warsaw Pact forces through the centuries-old
Fulda Gap invasion route2 in the central region of the Federal
Republic of Germany, or through the relatively vulnerable North
German Plain. Project Capstone requires assignment of individual hometown units of the National Guard and Reserve to specific
locations in the European Theater, enumeration of specific responsibilities and missions for accomplishment immediately after
arrival, and assignment of specific dates for deployment overseas.3
Some guardsmen and reservists would depart as early as two days
after mobilization (M-2), but others might deploy much later depending on the availability of air and sea transport. In an effort
to assist units to develop plans to accomplish wartime missions as
rapidly as possible, an increasing number of two and three-man
planning "cells" from National Guard units throughout the
United States are currently visiting the European Theater of Op4
erations as a part of their customary two-week annual training.

support activities, to encourage peacetime planning and training coordination
among all wartime-aligned units, to provide a better rationale for force planning,
to permit units deploying early in an emergency to be better manned and
equipped, and to simplify mobilization stationing for both deploying and nondeploying units. UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANDERS CALL, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at

180.
2. The central region of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
is marked by broad, flat valleys surrounded by steep, hilly terrain which is impassable to tanks. Natural "corridors" exist through the hilly terrain which have
been used by invaders going east or west since the days of the Roman Empire.
One of the most prominent of these natural "corridors" stretches westward from
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) to the heart of the Federal
Republic of Germany through a gap in the hills near the town of Fulda.
3. The deployment date for each unit is expressed as a specific number of
days after the President has declared mobilization.
4. The author is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, currently assigned as Operations Officer, 194th Engineer Brigade,
Tennessee Army National Guard. While serving as Director of War Planning for
the Brigade during a recent tour of duty in the European Theater, he conferred
extensively on the subject of this paper with Judge Advocate General staff officers of the Third Air Force in the United Kingdom and United States Army
units stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, including the 412th Engineer Command, the 21st Support Command, Seventh United States Army, and
Headquarters United States Army-Europe.
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Actions by Warsaw Pact troops in Poland and Afghanistan increase the likelihood that United States contingency war planning
will continue in the years ahead. The introduction of military personnel who will be in the European Theater of Operations for
only a few weeks poses several legal problems which will be the
subject of this Note. The human factor inherent in any discussion
of the law relating to military personnel creates excellent opportunities for case studies. After a brief examination of the law of
extradition, the law of the status of forces, and the effect of these
bodies of law on the unique federal-state status of members of
the Army National Guard, the provisions of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA),
will be applied to the hypothetical case of a captain of a home
town Guard unit who has committed a crime in a NATO signatory nation but who returns to the United States prior to the discovery of the crime. This hypothetical case undoubtedly will be
reflected in real world case studies as increasing numbers of
Guardsmen deploy for two week tours in Europe. The legal dilemma thus posed provides three possible courses of action:
(1) The United States Army can try the captain for homicide
under the court-martial provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' The major problem with this option is the significant question as to whether, given these facts, the United States
or the NATO signatory nation has jurisdiction over the crime.
(2) The United States and the NATO signatory nation can deal
with the case under the NATO SOFA. The major difficulty with
this option is that if NATO SOFA required the United States
Army to return the accused for trial in the NATO signatory nation, the Army would have no power to do this because it would
no longer have Title Ten federal in personam jurisdiction since
the guardsman has already reverted back to Title Thirty-Two
status.
(3) The United States and the NATO signatory nation in the
spirit of international comity and under the United States-United
Kingdom Extradition Treaty,7 can treat the matter as a case of
5. North Atlantic Treaty Agreement on Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, 4
U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter cited as NATO
SOFA].
6. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1976).
7. Treaty of Extradition, Oct. 21, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, 28
U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Extradition].
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extradition of a civilian. The stumbling block to this option is
that many nations traditionally will not extradite their own citizens to stand trial in a foreign land.
Before applying the law to this hypothetical case, this Note will
examine general international law regarding members of a "visiting force," 8 the status of visiting forces in the absence of any
agreements, former relevant international agreements, the NATO
SOFA, and the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Treaty.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STATUS OF FORCEs

Until the seventeenth century, both military law and international law were regarded as the embodiment of a greater common
law of Europe which originated in the civil law of the Roman Empire.9 For centuries Roman law was the only law taught in European universities. 10 Universally known and respected, Roman law
dominated international political and commercial situations
which were not appropriately subject to local law such as the
common law of England. Thus, the Law Merchant, maritime law,
and the law of international relations were controlled by the Roman civil law. Civil law jurists also dominated the development of
British military law until the end of the English Civil War." The
Elizabethans accorded great esteem to ancient Rome in all things
military, dnd the military law of ancient Rome was felt to be
more than adequate for turning modern Europeans into disciplined and effective soldiers.1 2 Thus, both international law and
8. A "visiting force" is a foreign military force present in a nation at its invitation. The visiting force is usually the military force of an ally.
9. See generally Carnahan, InternationalLaw in the United States Court of
Military Appeals, 3 B.C. INr'L & Comp. L. REv. 311, 312 (1980).
10. See B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 46-48 (1962); R.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 247-49 (4th ed. 1980).
11.
12.

See F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 165-67 (1960).
See H. WEBB, ELIZABETHAN MILITARY SCIENCE 25-26 (1965); C. BRAND,

ROMAN MILITARY LAW

143-44, 183 (1968). John Adams expressed similar senti-

ments while serving as a member of a committee of the Continental Congress
seeking to revise the articles of war:
There was extant one System of Articles of War, which had carried two

Empires to the head of Mankind, the Roman and the British: for the British Articles of War were only a literal translation of the Roman: it would
be in vain for us to seek ...for a more complete system of military discipline ....
3

DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS

409-10 (L. Butterfield ed. 1961),
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military law are rooted in the common stock of the Roman civil
law.
Today, of course, Roman law is not the only source of authority
for either United States military law or the law of nations. As
stated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
primary sources of modern international law are:
(1) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
(3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
13

Conventions and treaties are part of the "supreme law of the
land" under the Constitution,'14 and the United States Court of
Military Appeals, which is a civilian "supreme court" for the military justice system, has expressly acknowledged that treaties are
part of the law which it will apply. 15
A.

Two Divergent Theories of Jurisdiction:The Law of the
Flag v. TerritorialSovereignty

Territorial jurisdiction 6 is one of the basic attributes of sovereignty in public international law. Classically, the territorial jurisquoted in Crump, A History of the Structure of Military Justice in the United
States, 1775-1920 (pt. 1) A.F. L. REV., Winter 1974, at 41, 44; see Carnahan,
supra note 9, at 312-13.
13. Statute of the International Court of Justice, done June 26, 1945, art. 38,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.I.A.S. No. 993.
14. Autry v. Hyde, 19 C.M.A. 433, 436, 42 C.M.R. 35, 38 (1970).
15. Id. The Court of Military Appeals has, for example, held that treaties
and international agreements give to the United States military commanders
powers which they might not otherwise possess. See, e.g., United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A. 10, 37 C.M.R. 274 (1967); cf. United States v. Chasles, 9 C.M.A.
424, 26 C.M.R. 204 (1958) (international agreement supports the charge that a
"regulation" was violated by the accused). See generally Alley, The Overseas
Commander's Power to Regulate the Private Life, 37 MIL. L. REV. 115-20
(1967).
16. S. LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
LAW 7 (1971). Territorial jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction of a state over
individuals living in its territory, over things which are in this territory, and over
facts which occur there. Rousseau, Regime Actuel de Publications des Traites
en France, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PuSLic 250 (1953), quoted in S. LAZAREFF,

supra at 7.
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diction of a host nation is exclusive and complete.1 7 This exclusiv-

ity creates two consequences: the exclusive right to exercise all
activities in a state, and the explicit exclusion of any other state's
jurisdiction within the host nation's territory. On the other hand,
the principle of territorial jurisdiction may also be defined as a
continuum ranging from full territorial sovereignty in situations
in which the host nation's law is the only law, to limited territorial jurisdiction in situations in which some degree of foreign sovereign immunity is granted to the visiting military force. Peaceful
military occupation similar to the NATO model was practically
unknown until the end of the eighteenth century. War occupation, or occupatio bellica, is an occupation of an enemy territory
during hostilities, which- confers upon the occupying state extensive powers. The sovereignty of the occupied state, however, survives. In the late eighteenth century a variant of peaceful occupation developed. Under this theory the occupied state retained not
only the title but also the right to exercise its sovereignty. For
example, because the Prussian territories were not continguous,
Prussian forces had to pass through foreign territories to travel
from one garrison to another. As a result, agreements to regulate
the conditions of passage and the status of forces were created. In
most of these early cases, however, very small contingents were
present for only a brief duration and only under exceptional circumstances. NATO has altered the legal situation regarding the
passage of troops because modern occupations last for considerable lengths of time, occupying forces have become increasingly
important, and acceptance of permanent international tension is
far different from past attitudes.18
The admission of a foreign force into a host nation during
peacetime is subject to the agreement of the territorial sovereign,
which normally defines the rights and obligations of the foreign
force. If no formal agreement exists the courts must fill the gap.
The concept of territorial sovereignty commands the conclusion
that if the specific legal position of the foreign force has not been
17. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 7. Terminology in this area of the law
revolves around protection of the interests of "sending" and "receiving" states,
as well as the status of a "visiting force." To briefly summarize, the United

States is a "sending" state when it deploys a "visiting force" consisting of Army
personnel to the United Kingdom; the United Kingdom would then be characterized as a "receiving" state or "host nation."
18. See generally id. at 7-8.
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defined, the act of admitting a foreign force cannot by itself be
interpreted as granting exorbitant rights within the host nation.
Therefore, except for the internal disciplinary power armies inherently exercise over their employees, a foreign force is subject
to the laws of the receiving state. There are two divergent views
regarding this conflicting jurisdiction. Under the "law of the flag"
theory 9 the visiting force enjoys extensive jurisdictional powers.
This is often referred to as foreign sovereign immunity. On the
other hand, under the theory of territorial sovereignty the sending state and the receiving state would share the jurisdictional
power. There is no known example of visiting forces completely
subject to the receiving state's laws, but the degree of legal autonomy enjoyed by visiting forces varies.2 0
B.

The Law of the Flag: Background

It is undisputed that members of a visiting force are subject to
their own national military discipline. A United States soldier
who disobeys an order commits the same offense whether he is in
the United States or abroad. He is punished according to the
rules of United States military discipline2 1 using an internal procedure which is of no interest to the receiving state and which
does not interfere with the sovereignty of that state. Only in exceptional cases do the courts of a receiving state become involved
in such matters.22 But the situation is more complex if the offense
19. Under the law of the flag, or foreign sovereign immunity, a soldier serving in a foreign land is a representative of his sovereign. He is answerable, there-

fore, only to the law of the flag under which he marches.
20. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 8-9.
21. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (Supp. 1981). The
Uniform Code of Military Justice is applicable to all members of a regular com-

ponent of the armed forces, i.e., the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast
Guard (when operating as a service of the Navy in time of war). 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 802(3) (Supp. 1981).
22. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Qualified Jurisdictional Immunity,

[1954] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 341. See also S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 9 n.7.
Barton posits the case of a Swiss soldier assigned to a Swiss detachment in
United Kingdom territory. This soldier disobeys an order. He is arresied, tried

by the Swiss in the United Kingdom, punished and detained. Although he is still
in the United Kingdom, he resides in barracks put at the disposal of the Swiss

Army. If this solider asks for a writ of habeas corpus from a British court it is
likely that he will obtain satisfaction since his detention cannot be justified
under the law of the United Kingdom. The situation would be different if a
treaty recognizing the competence of the Swiss Army to deal with military of-
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in question is an offense against the law of the receiving state. In
these cases there is a real conflict between the territorial jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the flag. Earlier United States and
United Kingdom writers and cases exhibited more support for the
law of the flag theory while most post-World War II legal authorities in these nations have advocated a concept of restricted terri-

torial sovereignty under which jurisdiction is divided between the
courts of the sending and the receiving states.2 3
The arguments favoring th6 law of the flag are summarized as
follows:
Strong grounds of convenience and necessity prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign organized military force which,
with the consent of the territorial sovereign, enters its domain.
Members of the force who there commit offenses are dealt with by
the military or other authorities of the State to whose24service they
belong, unless the offenders are voluntarily given up.
A German writer, Oppenheim, explained:
Whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the service of
their home State, they are considered extraterritorial and remain,
therefore, under its jurisdiction. A crime committed on foreign territority by a member of these forces cannot be punished by the
local civil or military authorities, but only by the commanding25officer of the forces or by other authorities of their home State.
But he qualified his statement:
This rule, however, applies only in case the crime is committed,
either within the place where the force is stationed, or in some
place where the criminal was on duty; it does not apply, if, for example, soldiers belonging to a foreign garrison of a fortress leave
the rayon of the fortress, not on duty but for recreation and pleasure, and then and there commit a crime. The local authorities are
in that case competent to punish them .... 28
A French writer explained:
The overriding principle in this field is as follows: any force operating on foreign soil is in no way subject to the territorial sovereign and exercises an exclusive right of jurisdiction over its memfenses
23.
24.
25.
26.

in the United Kingdom were in force. Id.
S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 11.
C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1951).
L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 445 (4th ed. 1948).
Id.
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bers. On this point, the writers, the laws, and the practice are
agreed, whether in a case of occupatio bellica, or of conventional
occupation resulting from a treaty, or, as in the present case, when
forces are present to cooperate with the local forces. 27
The Casablanca Deserters,28 a famous early European case, is
frequently cited for the proposition that a force on foreign soil is
not subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign.2 9 In
1908 Casablanca, a Moroccan city, was occupied and garrisoned
by the French military forces. Six French Foreign Legion deserters, three of whom were German nationals, attempted to board a
German ship anchored in the harbor, while guided by and under
the protection of the Chancellor of the German Consulate. The
deserters were recognized by a French soldier on duty and a
struggle ensued during their arrest. The two governments decided
to refer the case to arbitration, and Germany agreed that her
Consul had been wrong in extending his protection to the non-

German nationals. The problem before the court was the legality
of the protections afforded the three German nationals.3 0
The Permanent Court of the Hague held:
The difficulty of this case lay in that two particular situations, both
exorbitant and both related to the concept usually known as "extra
territoriality," were in conflict. Each of the Parties was claiming
exclusive jurisdiction over the deserters. Germany was invoking the
"Capitulations Regime" applying in Morocco .... France was invoking, in order to claim exclusive jurisdiction over the deserters,
the rights belonging to an occupation force over the members of
that force.3 1
In enunciating the law of the flag, the Court noted that Casa27.

S.

LAZAREFF,

supra note 16, at 126 (quoting and translating A.

CHALUFOUR, LE STATUT JURIDIQUE DES FORCES ALIEES PENDANT LA GUERRE

1914-

1918 (1927) (thesis, Les Presses Modernes, Paris) [hereinafter cited as A.
CHALUFOUR].

28. The Casablanca Deserters (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909), reprinted in REVUE
36-39 (1909) [hereinafter cited as
The Casablanca Deserters]. See generally Gidel, REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 326 (1910); Gidel, The CasablancaDeserters, II RECUEIL DE
JURISPRUDENCE DALLOZ 177 (1911); Pillet, IV RECUEIL SIREY 1 (1911).
29. King, Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly
Armed Forces, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1946).
30. The Casablanca Deserters, supra note 28.
31. Gidel, The CasablancaDeserters, II RECUEIL DE JURISPRUDENCE DALLOZ
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc

177 (1911).
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blanca was militarily occupied and garrisoned by French military
forces, that France was not at war but had intervened internationally for the protection of French and foreign residents in Morocco, and that an occupation force as a rule exercises an exclusive right of jurisdiction over all persons belonging to the force in
spite of the Capitulations Regime. The Court carefully worded its
decision, however, because as the phrase "as a rule" indicates, an
occupation force does not always have jurisdiction over all persons in the force. This difference between always having jurisdiction and almost always having jurisdiction has given opposing
scholars a basis for their arguments.
The leading United States decision involving the law of the flag
was rendered by the Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange
32 In October 1810 the schooner Exchange, owned
v. McFadden.
by two United States citizens, left Baltimore for Spain. Although
France and the United States were not at war, a French man-ofwar seized the schooner which was assigned to the French fleet
and renamed Balaou Five. Thereafter, a storm compelled it to
seek safe harbor at Philadelphia for repairs. The United States

owners filed a libel in the United States district court asserting
their ownership and seeking a decree restoring possession of the
schooner. The United States attorney then filed a suggestion that
the schooner was an armed French public vessel which had been
forced out of necessity to enter the port. The district court dismissed the libel on the grounds that a friendly armed public vessel was not under the jurisdiction of a United States court, but
the circuit court reversed. When the Supreme Court reinstated
the dismissal, Chief Justice John Marshall enunciated the principle of the law of the flag: although the jurisdiction of a nation
within its own territory is susceptible only of self-imposed limitations, exceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction exist and are traceable to the express or implied consent of the territorial sovereign.3 3 After noting the immunity accorded a foreign sovereign,"'
Chief Justice Marshall said that a sovereign is also understood to
have ceded a portion of his territorial jurisdiction in situations in
which the state allows the troops of a foreign nation to pass
through its territory.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
33. Id. at 135-36.
34. Id. at 138.
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In such a case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction
over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, the
sovereign who should attempt to exercise it, would certainly be
considered as violating his faith .... The grant of free passage,
therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops, during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline, and to inflict those punishments which the government of
his army may require.3 5
Chief Justice Marshall found no requirement that a right of passage be granted to foreign armed warships, because "the ports of
a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all
powers with whom it is at peace."3 6 For law of the flag partisans,
this statement implied that friendly forces on foreign soil would
be immune from the jurisdiction of the foreign nation. But
many writers argue that such an interpretation of Chief Justice
Marshall's dictum is incorrect 8 The purpose of the libel, according to these sources, was to gain jurisdiction over the force (the

ship), not the members of the force (the crew). This has been
pointed out by the Court of New South Wales (Australia):
[W]hat the learned judge had in mind was exercise of a jurisdiction
which would prevent the troops from acting as a force ... not exercise of jurisdiction over individual soldiers in respect of liabilities
incurred or wrongs done, perhaps out of all connection with their
military duties.39
Another argument against a broad interpretation of Marshall's
words is that the waiver of jurisdiction over troops during their
passage applied only to offenses against the army's regulations
and that the territorial sovereign reserved the right to exercise its
sovereignty when an offense was committed against its own laws.
But more important is the consideration that Chief Justice Marshall's remarks only applied to troops "during their passage," a
comparatively short period of time and certainly not analogous to
the long-term stationing of United States forces on the soil of
NATO allies.
Eight years after The Schooner Exchange decision, similar
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 141.
S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 15.
See, e.g., Wright v. Cantrell, 44 N.S.W. 45, 49 (1943) (opinion of Jordan,

C.J.).
39. Id.
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facts confronted a British court in The Prins Fredrik.40 The Advocate of the Admiralty argued that public property belonging to
a foreign sovereign and destined for public use was exempt from
the jurisdiction of British courts under the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity. His argument, which expanded the law of
the flag, was successful. In 1880, Lord Brett in the Court of Appeals case The Parlement Belge41 relied on these earlier holdings
to find a Belgian mail packet immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United Kingdom. The zenith of United States law of
4 2
Justhe flag cases was Berizzi Bros. v. The Steamship Pesaro.
tice Van Devanter in Berizzi affirmed the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine by finding that The Pesaro, a government-owned
merchant vessel, was used for a public purpose. The Court stated,
"We know of no international usage which regards the maintenance and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in
time of peace as any less a public
purpose than the maintenance
'4 3
and training of a naval force.

Subsequent United States cases have maintained the Exchange
doctrine in situations involving the passage of troops. In Tucker
v. AlexandroffI the Court stated, "[I]f foreign troops are permitted to enter or cross our territory, they are still subject to the
control of their own officers and exempt from local jurisdiction."4 5
The Supreme Court of Panama also has held that passing foreign
troops are exempt from local jurisdiction. 4 Again, it must be emphasized that this Panamanian decision applied the law of the
flag to crossing forces, not stationed forces. Even authorities who
support the law of the flag do not propound unqualified foreign
40. 165 Eng. Rep. 1543 (1820).
41, [1879-80] 5 P.D. 197.
42. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
43. Id. at 574. See generally Note, Reciprocal Influence of British and
United States Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law From The Schooner Exchange to the State Immunity Act of 1978, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 761, 76876 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reciprocal Influence].
44. 183 U.S. 424 (1901).
45. Id. at 433.
46. Republic of Panama v. Schwartzfiger, reprinted in 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 182
(1927).

It is a principle of international law that an armed force of one state, when
crossing the territory of another friendly country with the acquiescence of
the latter, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign but

to that of the officers and superior authorities of its own command.
Id, at 184-85.
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sovereign immunity for forces stationed on foreign soil.4 7
C.

TerritorialSovereignty: Background

A receiving state possesses a general and unrestricted right of
jurisdiction over the members of a visiting force if the principle of
territorial sovereignty is given its fullest application. As a corollary, there is a complete denial of jurisdiction to the powers commanding the visiting force so that the leaders of the visiting force
cease effective command. This theory has never been entertained
seriously. A member of a visiting force represents his state of origin, and many contemporary writers now agree that the territorial
sovereign must give special consideration to the application of the
theory of territorial sovereignty' in cases involving the representation of the foreign state by its agents.
Many characteristics distinguish territorial sovereignty over a
visiting force from sovereign immunity for the visiting force. Sim-

ply stated, under territorial sovereignty the visiting soldier is answerable only to the sovereign through whose land he marches.
On the other hand, a system of sovereign immunity for a visiting
force would hold the same soldier answerable only to the sovereign under whose flag he marches. These two sovereigns represent
either end of a continuum. The growth of the concept of restricted sovereign immunity began with a 1938 House of Lords
decision, Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Steamship Christiana.4 9 Although the court held that a Spanish merchant ship, requisitioned by and in the possession of the Spanish government,
was immune from a suit by the former owners, Lord Maughan
expressed serious reservations concerning the analysis in The
8 0 This doubt took
Parlement Belge and The Schooner Exchange.
root and came to fruition in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 1 in
which a ship owned by the Mexican government but not in its
possession or in public service was subjected to an in rem lien in a
California district court. After determining that Mexican ownership was not sufficient without the requisite public use, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny immunity. In Ex Parte

47. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 17.
48.

Id. at 18.

49. [1938] A.C. 485.
50. Id. at 518-23.
51. 324 U.S. 30, 41 (1945).
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Republic of Peru,52 the Court identified courses of action that a
foreign sovereign might follow to claim immunity. It could appear
in court and raise the immunity issue, or it could request that the
Department of State authorize the court to recognize the immunity of the foreign sovereign. This option was later reinforced by
the famous "Tate Letter" 53 in which the Department of State's
Acting Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate, informed the Acting Attorney
General, Philip B. Perlman, that he advocated the restrictive the-

ory of immunity under which only certain acts of a foreign sovereign would be immune.54 While the State Department would no
longer recognize immunity for private acts, it would continue to
authorize immunity for public acts.8 5 Confusion occurred, however, during attempts to distinguish between the public and the
private acts which would trigger immunity.
The issue of whether visiting forces are immune from local jurisdiction was confronted in United States v. Sinigar.5 6 Sinigar, a
United States Army private stationed in Canada, was called to
testify before a Canadian coroner's inquest. He refused and was
jailed for contempt. Thereafter, he was tried by a United States
Army courtmartial for conduct bringing discredit upon the armed
forces. The Court of Military Appeals held that "concurrent jurisdiction" 57 existed since customary international law did not prevent both sovereigns from bringing charges against Sinigar. In
United States v. Robertson,5" a merchant seaman serving aboard
a United States Department of Commerce vessel carrying armed
forces cargo killed a fellow seaman in a Yokohama waterfront
brawl. On appeal, Robertson contested the Navy courtmartial's
jurisdiction by arguing that while the administrative agreement
between Japan and the United States granted the latter exclusive
jurisidiction over members of the civilian component, he was not
a part of that civilian component. The Court of Military Appeals
52. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
53. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). In this letter, Jack B. Tate reviewed

the trend among other nations toward use of the restrictive theory of territorial
sovereign immunity, as opposed to the classical or virtually absolute theory of
foreign sovereign immunity. Id.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
See generally Reciprocal Influence, supra note 43, at 793.
6 C.M.A. 330, 20 C.M.R. 46 (1955).
6 C.M.A. at 336-37, 20 C.M.R. at 52-53.
5 C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955).
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agreed with Robertson, 59 but nevertheless found him properly
subject to United States military jurisdiction since his status as a
civilian accompanying the force gave rise to concurrent United
States and Japanese jurisdiction."0 United States v. Cadenhead1
also involved the question of concurrent jurisdiction, but the
Court of Military Appeals held that "American military personnel

stationed in Japan on a permanent basis may be tried by Japan
for offenses committed within its territory and punishable by its
laws."82
The Court's decisions on the status of visiting forces under customary international law then may be summarized as follows:
(1) Foreign military courts are permitted to exercise jurisdiction
over members of the force in the territory of another State.
(2) Taken together, Robertson, Sinigar, and Cadenhead establish
that the local authorities may also exercise jurisdiction over members of the foreign force, at least for offenses committed off-duty
and outside of camp.
(3) Foreign military courts may treat civilians accompanying their
force as members of that force, so long as those civilians are not
nationals of the State where the trial is held."
In 1965 the American Law Institute adopted the restrictive approach to territorial sovereign immunity in proceedings arising
out of commercial activities.6 4 Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the decision in The Philippine Admiral Owners v. Wallem
Shipping Ltd.,6 5 in which the Privy Council accepted jurisdiction
over a Philippine Government vessel used solely for trading purposes, initiated a process which eventually led to the legislative
adoption of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity. On appeal Lord Cross pronounced the unanimous opinion of the Privy
Council that the precedents favoring the absolute doctrine of sov-

ereign immunity were based on erroneous interpretations of The
Parlement Belge.6"
The enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of

59.
60.
61.
62.

5 C.M.A. at 814-18, 19 C.M.R. at 111-14.
5 C.M.A. at 818-20, 19 C.M.R. at 114-16.
14 C.M.A. 271, 34 C.M.R. 51 (1963).
14 C.M.A. at 272-73, 34 C.M.R. at 52-53.

63.
64.

Carnahan, supra note 9, at 336.

65.

[1977] A.C. 373.

66.

Id. at 394.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw

§ 69 (1965).
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1976 (FSIA)67 in the United States was an attempt to clarify the
distinction between public and private acts. Facially, the FSIA
drew the distinction. In reality, however, it left many aspects of
the distinction open for future court interpretations. Similarly,
the British enacted the State Immunity Act of 1978 (State Act),"8
which was viewed by some scholars as an improvement over the
United States Act Both acts begin with the premise that foreign sovereigns are entitled to immunity but both carefully limit
that immunity through several enumerated exceptions. The FSIA
and the State Act indicate that neither the sovereign host nor the
sovereign commander will have exclusive jurisdictional control on
questions involving members of a visiting force on the soil of a
foreign ally. Restrictive territorial sovereignty prevailed over both
the law of the flag and absolute sovereign immunity.
III. FORMER AGREEMENTS
Agreements on the status of visiting forces have undergone a
steady evolution since the law of the flag lost currency after the
First World War. As the move toward concurrent jurisdiction proceeded, questions parallel to the question caused by ambiguities
in acts such as the FSIA and the State Act developed regarding
which sovereign controlled in any given situation. Despite concurrent jurisdiction, however, the United States consistently sought
the exclusive right to jurisdiction over its forces.7 0
The nations which negotiated status of forces agreements during the First World War 1 did not separate jurisdictional power
from the military disciplinary power which was an essential part
of the military organization structure. As early as 1914, the Belgian and French governments had entered into an agreement 2 establishing the general competence of military jurisdiction over the
members of each force, or against those who could prejudice each
force. This emphasis on the right of a military force to claim ju-

67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
68. C.33. See generally Statement of the Solicitor General, 949 PARL. DES.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 412 (1978).
69. Delaume, The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 185, 198-99 (1979).
70. S.LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 19.

71.

Id.

72. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 20 (quoting and translating A. CHALUFOUR,
supra note 27, at 48).
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risdiction involved neither a consideration of the territory in
which the offense was committed nor of the nationality of the offender.7 3 The fact that the jurisdictional criterion was the damag-

ing act rather than the nationality of the offender implies that the
basis of this agreement was more akin to territorial sovereignty
than to the law of the flag. In 1915, an agreement between France
and the United Kingdom 4 recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of
the tribunals over their respective forces, regardless of either the
rights of the territorial sovereign of the place in which the act was
committed or of the nationality of the accused. 75 General Pershing's agreement with the French stressed the law of the flag by
providing that each nation would possess exclusive criminal
jurisiction over all personnel subject to its military law. During
the war, however, the United Kingdom continued to request that
its right to exercise control as a territorial sovereign be respected,
while the United States continued to seek exclusive rights of jurisdiction over all United States military personnel regardless of
the nature of the offense or the right of the territorial sovereign of
the place in which it was committed. In fact, the point was made
moot by the agreements entered into at the end of the war. Two
conclusions are apparent from the First World War agreements.

First, the law of the flag generally was not applied since the rule
of territorial sovereignty was upheld, and even the agreements ostensibly utilizing the law of the flag were quite flexible in their
application.76 Second, each Allied army ruled a well-determined
zone from which most civilians had been evacuated so that jurisdictional disputes only arose outside these zones of de facto sovereignty. These disputes generally involved personnel on leaves of
absence. Thus the First World War did not establish the preeminence of the law of the flag. 7
The Second World War presented an entirely different situation. Instead of the well-determined zones of operation which had
characterized previous army operations, most of the Allied Forces
were scattered throughout the United Kingdom during the period
prior to the Normandy invasion. These forces mingled with the
population and traveled on the public roads, raising an entirely

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 22.
77. Id. at 21.
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new set of legal issues regarding the status of forces. These new
questions began the evolution of jurisdictional rules which has
culminated with the current NATO stationing arrangements. Although the Allied Forces Act"8 gave jurisdiction to the Allied military courts solely for questions of discipline and administration of
the forces and reserved concurrent jurisdiction for offenses punishable under the laws of both the sending and receiving states,
Parliament acceded to United States requests that the law of the
flag receive certain preferences. The United States of America
(Visiting Forces) Act of 1942 provided that "[S]ubject as hereinafter provided, no criminal proceedings shall be prosecuted in the
United Kingdom before any court of the United Kingdom against
a member of the military or naval forces of the United States of
America." 7 91 The Visiting Forces Act did not, however, mark the
universal acceptance of the law of the flag as the preeminent jurisdictional rule. In the United Kingdom only the United States
forces were enjoying complete immunity from United Kingdom
jurisdiction, while the other Allied Forces stationed in the United
Kingdom enjoyed only the restricted and concurrent jurisdiction
provided by the Allied Forces Act.
In 1943 a United States delegation in Ottawa sought to obtain
exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel stationed in

Canada. An advisory opinion by the Supreme Court of Canada
prompted the Canadian Parliament to grant the United States
request and confer exclusive jurisdiction. 0 Secured by a detailed
agreement, the law of the flag thus received support, as it did in
82
81
similar United States agreements with Australia, Belgium,

China, 3 Egypt, '4 India,85 and New Zealand. 8 Also instructive was
78. 3 & 4 Geo. 6, c. 5 (1940).
79. 5 & 6 Geo. 6, c. 31, § 1 (1942).
80. Exchange of notes of Dec. 27, 1943, Feb. 10 & Mar. 9, 1944, cited in
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, H.R. REP. No. 309, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1955-56).
81. Unilateral Declaration by the Australian Authorities, AusTL. STAT. R.
No. 241 (Mar. 27, 1942); see COMMONWEALTH GAZETTE, May 27, 1942.
82. Agreement on Jurisdiction Over Criminal Offenses Committed by Armed
Forces in the Belgian Congo, Aug. 4, 1943, United States-Belgium, 51 Stat. 1215,
E.A.S. No. 395.
83. Agreement on Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses Committed by Armed
Forces, May 21, 1943, United States-China, 57 Stat. 1248, E.A.S. No. 360.
84. Agreement on Criminal Offenses Committed by Armed Forces, Mar. 2,
1943, United States-Egypt, 57 Stat. 1197, E.A.S. No. 356.
85. Agreement on Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses Committed by Armed
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the legal status accorded the Allied Forces at the time of the 1944
Normandy invasion. The French Provisional Government authorized the Allied military -authorities to exercise an exclusive right
of jurisdiction over their forces, with the settlement of damage
87
claims to be reserved for the Allied Reparations Commission.
The urgency of the situation justified these exceptional procedures. Rather than drawing any firm conclusions as to the jurisdictional principles expressed in the agreements (the law of the
flag or territorial sovereignty), the significance of power to enforce
the provisions of this agreement must be emphasized. The more
powerful states generally obtained a broader right of jurisdiction
than did the less powerful states.
The end of World War II did not eliminate the jurisdictional
questions raised by the stationing of forces outside their state of
origin. The occupation of Germany and Austria made it necessary
to set up a line of communications reaching from the ports of
France to the United States garrisons beyond the German frontier. In order to facilitate the transit of, and logistical support for,
personnel, additional garrisons were established along the communications line. Two categories of United States personnel thus
existed in France-personnel who were in transit and permanently stationed personnel. While most of the bilateral agreements with France have not been published,' one significant document expressing the intent of the parties was published in the
Agreement of November 6, 1950.89 This document stated the
principle of territorial sovereignty and gave jurisdiction to French
courts to try United States military personnel, although United
States authorities normally asked for a waiver of French jurisdiction if the offense had been committed in the performance of official United States military duties. The Minister of Justice, however, would decide on each waiver, thus strengthening the
principle of territorial sovereignty. In practice, the French also
waived jurisdiction when the victim was a member of the United
Forces, Sept. 29, 1942, United States-India, 58 Stat. 1199, E.A.S. No. 392.
86. Agreement on Military Forces, Mar. 31, 1942, United States-New Zealand, 56 Stat. 1896, E.A.S. No. 305.
87. Exchange of notes of Dec. 11, 1942 and Mar. 23, 1943; see COMMONWEALTH GAZETTE, Apr. 8, 1943.
88. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 34. Most of these agreements remain
secret.

89. Id. at 29, See generally F. POGNE, TE UNrrED STATEs ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II-THE SUPREME COMMAND (1948) (the official Department of the Army).
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States forces or when the offense was punishable under United
States law and not under French law. Although it was technically
impossible for a French citizen to take the United States to court
for a tort claim, a procedure was devised to allow such claims to
be submitted to United States claims officers and passed to the
Chief of the French Liaison Office for a recommendation based on
French law. Satisfaction of these claims usually depended upon
the French authorities' recommendations.9 0 Although the system
worked remarkably well, it raised complaints that the French citizens were denied their "day in court." '
The bilateral agreements that have been signed between the
United States and over fifty foreign governments fall into three
categories. In the first category are the few agreements that grant
to the sending state an exclusive right of jursidiction over a member of the force. These include agreements with Korea, 2 Denmark (only for matters involving Greenland), 3 and Japan." The
second category includes the few agreements which distribute the
right of jurisdiction between the sending state and the receiving
state on the basis of the place in which the offense was committed. Examples include agreements between the United States and

Saudi Arabia," the Bahamas,9" and the Dominican Republic."
The great bulk of all agreements between the United States and
foreign nations falls into a third category. These agreements generally consist of a system of concurrent jurisdiction superimposed
on a system in which jurisdiction is based upon the nature of the
90. Lavauzelle, L'Organisation Militaire Atlantique, Edition Methodique
No. 110-11, Droit International, BULLETIN OFFICIEL DE MNISTERE DE LA GU RRE

(1956).
91. S.LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 35-37.
92. Agreement on Jurisdiction over Offenses by United States Forces in Korea, July 12, 1950, United States-Korea, 5 U.S.T. 1408, T.I.A.S. No. 3012. The
invasion of South Korea began on June 25, 1950.
93. Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, Apr. 27, 1951, United StatesDenmark, 2 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 2292.
94. Agreement on Article HI of the Security Treaty, Feb. 28, 1952, United
States-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
95. Agreement on the Airbase at Dhahran, June 18, 1951, United StatesSaudi Arabia, 2 U.S.T. 1466, T.I.A.S. No. 2290, extended on Apr. 2, 1957, 8

U.S.T. 403, T.I.A.S. No. 3790.
96. Agreement on the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground, July 21, 1950,
United States-United Kingdom, 1 U.S.T. 545, T.I.A.S. No. 2099.

97. Agreement on the Long Range Proving Ground for Guided Missiles, Nov.
26, 1951, United States-Dominican Republic, 3 U.S.T. 2569, T.I.A.S. No. 2425.
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offense. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction reconciles the
disparate concepts of territorial sovereignty and the immunity of
a foreign sovereign. Two categories of offenses give rise to concurrent jurisdiction. First are the offenses against the law of the
sending state, its property, or a member of the same force to
which the offender belongs. Second, there are all other offenses.
Authorities of the receiving state usually will prosecute offenses
falling in the first category only if special considerations require
them to do so. In the second category of cases, the receiving state
normally will preserve its priority of jurisdiction but will entertain a request for waiver from the sending state. These principles
were exemplified in the Agreement on the Status of Members of
the Armed Forces of the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Brussels, which was signed at London, December 21, 1949, but never
put in force. 8
All of these agreements regarding the status of forces stationed
in a foreign country are supported by certain customary practices.
Even such ardent supporters of the law of the flag as the United

States Department of State, there is agreement that the admittance of a foreign force into a territory is always dependent on
the approval of the territorial sovereign. In addition, Chief Justice
Marshall's formulations in The Schooner Exchange, involving the
disciplinary power of the force, are still valid. Nevertheless, drawing a distinction between infringement of the law of the receiving
state and disciplinary offenses often creates a problem since some
acts are offenses against both. It is apparent, though, that most
civil and criminal offenses will be subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign. The principal exception is the offense committed while in the performance of official duty.
The desires and requirements of both the sending and the receiving states must be carefully considered in any jurisdictional
system; often this requires that both states have some measure of
jurisdiction-at the same time. While the jurisdiction of one is usually subordinate to that of the other, this concurrent jurisdiction
calls for a structure in which both sides are clearly aware of their
respective rights and responsibilities, thereby minimizing disagreements and conflicts.
Most agreements today are based on the initial assumption that
the territorial sovereign has unique rights with certain enumer98. S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 45-47.
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ated exceptions. These exceptions can only be justified by agreements clearly determining respective jurisdictional rights. Thus
agreements regarding shared jurisdiction may be classified into
six categories:
(1) Agreements in which jurisdiction is based on the nature
of the offense. This system is advantageous to both the nation sending the forces and the host nation because punishments are based on national preferences and norms.
(2) Agreements in which territorial jurisdiction governs unless otherwise stipulated. This concept, exemplified in the
Brussels Agreement, gives the receiving state the option of
waiving its jurisdiction in situations in which special circumstances prompt the sending state to claim jurisdiction.
(3) Agreements in which the sending state has jurisdiction
unless otherwise stipulated. The sending state can grant or
refuse requests to waive jursidiction, but this procedure obviously impairs territorial sovereignty.
(4) Agreements in which jurisdiction depends on the location
in which the offense was committed. This concept is seldom
used because it disregards territorial sovereignty.
(5) Agreements in which jurisdiction is dependent upon
whether the offense was committed in times of peace or war.
This concept usually results in the sending state receiving
more extensive rights in time of war.
(6) Agreements in which the force is assimilated with diplomatic personnel. This is the procedure normally followed
when United States Marine personnel are assigned to United
States embassies abroad. Such assimilation can be conceivable only when the strength of the stationed force is quite
small and it fulfills its duties under the control of an embassy or a Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG),
such as is often found in nations allied to the United States.
All of these competing theories indicate that there was no single
established and undisputed doctrine defining the status of forces
abroad when the North Atlantic Treaty became operative. As previously discussed, by the operative date of the North Atlantic
Treaty court decisions in the United States and the United Kingdom had swung back to a preference for territorial sovereignty
based on the "common" international law. In 1953 the only support for the law of the flag and the immunity of foreign sovereigns
from jurisdiction was found in specific written agreements among
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the various allies. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty therefore had the burden of formulating formal positions regarding the
status of national forces on foreign soil. 99

IV. THE NATO

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

(NATO SOFA)

A. Negotiations
The initial decision confronting the North Atlantic Treaty parties was whether to use bilateral or multilateral agreements to effectuate common goals. Adoption of a series of bilateral agreements had the advantage of promoting a certain amount of
specificity since each agreement could be drafted to address certain preexisting geographical political conditions. Such a move
would not have been acceptable to the receiving states, however,
since a bilateral agreement does not constitute a satisfactory justification "for the presence of foreign forces which are neither
conquerors nor guests." 100 This psychological aspect of the problem was of paramount concern since the population of many potential receiving states viewed
[t]he American soldier [as] a constant model of the national weakness; his presence itself reminds nations jealous of their independence that they are no longer in a position to defend themselves by
their own means .... Ordinarily, the American soldier has more
money than the native and spends it in a way which irritates the

local population ....[T]he American servicemen arrive carrying
with them their accent, their electric refrigerators, their up-to-date
cars, their high pay and their own style of life. 10 1

A multilateral agreement, on the other hand, would signify equal
treatment for all of the allies. Indeed, within the framework of an
alliance the presence of foreign forces loses the connotation of an
"occupation" and becomes a feature of the federal type of organization in which the receiving state is an equal partner. Under the
aegis of a multilateral agreement, common legal and administrative principles would guide all NATO states. Significantly, five of
99.

Id. at 57-59.

100. Flory, Les Bases Militairesa L'Etranger,ANNUAMIE
INTERNATIONAL 3, 5 (1955) (translation by this author).

FRANCAS DE DROIT

101. Whitton, L'Exercice de la Competence Penale a l'Egard des Forces

Americaines a l'Etranger,REvUE
(1959).

GENERALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc

6
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the signatory states of the original North Atlantic Treaty102 were

already parties to the multilateral agreement on the status of
forces under the Brussels Treaty.103
B. Criminal Jurisdiction
Article VII of the NATO SOFA deals with the allocation of
criminal jurisdiction and is the most controversial article of the
agreement. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction is an essential attribute of territorial sovereignty, but the law of the flag would
accord criminal jurisdiction to the sending state. The differing legal systems and legal traditions within the nations of the Alliance
complicated a choice between these competing jurisdictional theories. For example, the right of trial by jury is not a fundamental
basis of the legal systems of each of the NATO members.' 0 ' The
other major problem in choosing a basis for jurisdiction was the
wide variation in punishments for any given offense prescribed by
each of the signatory nations.1 05 As a result of these variations,
positions on the jurisdiction question ranged from those who felt
that any waiver of jurisdiction constituted an infringement on

territorial sovereignty to those at the other end of the spectrum
who felt it was wrong to subject military personnel contributing

to a foreign state's defense to the jurisdiction of the foreign
courts.Yoe

The Girard case,10 7 which dealt with a similar issue involving
the Japanese Protocol,1 0 8 caused an international controversy

102. These were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and
The Netherlands. See S. LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 64 & n.3.
103. See generally id. at 63-64.
104. Id. at 128.
105. See generally id. at 128-29.
We have happily come a long way from the days of Colonel Minuti. The
colonel, a Venetian officer attached to the diplomatic mission in Turkey in
1749, wounded a Janissire (Turkish infantry soldier member of sultan's
guard) as a result of a fight provoked by an insult from the latter. The
colonel was handed over by Venice to the Turkish authorities who immediately proceeded to decapitate him. Today, verbal violence has replaced
this procedure of summary justice.
Id. at 129.
106. Many United States Senators, for example, disagreed on this point. See
Baldwin, Foreign Jurisdiction and the American Soldier: The Adventures of
Girard,1958 Wis. L. REv. 52, 58.
107. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
108. Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement
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which not only threatened the very existence of the United

States-Japan Alliance, but also became a major point of disagree10
ment in the United States Senate debate on the NATO SOFA.
Pursuant to the Security Treaty of 1952 between Japan and the
United States, certain offenses were designated as falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of one country, while in other instances
both exercised concurrent jurisiction although one nation would
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. 110 Army Specialist
Girard was charged with the wrongful death of a Japanese woman
on a firing range, and the United States decided to waive its right
to primary jurisdiction in deference to Japanese authorities. At
trial, Girard contended that delivering him to the Japanese Government violated his constitutional rights since he killed the woman while performing an official duty. In direct contrast to the
"law of the flag" rationale in The Schooner Exchange, the Girard
court explained that a sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction
to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders
by members of a visiting force, unless it expressly or impliedly
consents to surrender its jurisdiction.'
The question before the Senate during the 1953 debates"" was
whether, in the absence of a treaty provision similar to the provision found in Girard,a receiving state should have jurisdiction to
try United States soldiers. Senator Bricker, a firm supporter of
the law of the flag, proposed a reservation to the NATO SOFA
which, if adopted, would have deprived the receiving state of all
criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed within its territory
regardless of the nature of the offense.113 Senator Bricker felt this
extreme move necessary in order to guarantee that Constitutional

rights of United States citizens would not be "bargained away" in
a treaty. The United States Supreme
Court later espoused a simi4
lar position in Reid v. Covert.."
under Article HI of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan,
Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848.
109. See generally Baldwin, supra note 106.
110. M. WHTmMAN, 6 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 746 (1968). There was
also a provision allowing waiver of this primary right to assert jurisdiction in
cases of particular importance to the other nation. Id.
111. 354 U.S. at 529.
112. 99 CONG. REc. 4659 (1953).
113. See Heath, Status of Forces Agreements as a Basis for United States
Custody of an Accused, 49 Mm.L. REv. 45, 49 (1970).
114. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). In Reid the Supreme Court held that "[n]o agree-
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After full debate 1 5 the Senate rejected the proposed reservation by a vote of 53 to 27.16 The NATO SOFA has thus formed a

model for all later negotiations concerning local jurisdiction over
United States forces. 17
Article VII of the NATO SOFA recognizes that the sending

state and the receiving state have concurrent jurisdiction over the
visiting force, and lays down the basic rules for the exercise of

this jurisdiction." 8s If an act is an offense solely under the laws of
one of the two states involved, paragraph two of article VII speciment with a foreign nation can confer power on Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution
...

."

Id. at 16. Reid was viewed as a particularly significant decision in mili-

tary circles since it involved an executive agreement between the United States
and the United Kingdom which permitted United States military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed in the United Kingdom by
United States servicemen or their dependents. Agreement on Jurisdiction over
Criminal Offenses by Armed Forces, July 27, 1942, United States-United Kingdom, 57 Stat. 1193, E.A.S. No. 355. The United States Government argued that
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(11) (West Supp. 1981),
insofar as it provided for the military trial of dependents accompanying the
armed forces, could be sustained as legislation necessary and proper to carry out
United States obligations under the executive agreement. The Supreme Court
replied that "[w]hen the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because
he happens to be in another land." 354 U.S. at 6. Citing the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution, the Court commented that "[tihere is nothing in
this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them
do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 16.
115. 99 CONG. REc. 4659 (1953).

116. Id. at 8782.
117. See Coker, The Status of Visiting Military Forces in Europe: NATO
SOFA, a Comparison, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 115 (M.
Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); Jordan, Creation of Customary International
Law by Way of Treaty, 9 A.F. JAG L. REv. 38 (1967).
118. Paragraph 1 of article VII of the NATO SOFA provides that:
Subject to the provisions of this Article:
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right
to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary
jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over
all persons subject to the military law of that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over
the members of a force or civilian component and their dependents
with respect to offenses committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.
NATO SOFA, supra note 6, 4 U.S.T. at 1798.
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fies that the state whose law has been violated would exercise exclusive jurisdiction. 11 9 Difficulties arise in situations in which an
act is punishable both by the law of the sending state and the
receiving state, and paragraph three resolves these problems by
creating a system of priorities between the sending and receiving
states for the right to exercise jurisdiction. 12 0 The receiving state,
however, has the primary right to exercise this jurisdiction in
most cases. The sending state gains the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction only if the offense "arises out of" the performance of

119. Paragraph 2 of article VII of the NATO SOFA provides that:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of
that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the
receiving State.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and
their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to
the security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the
sending State.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a
security offence against a State shall include
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage, or violation of any law relating to the national
defence of that State.
Id.

120. Paragraph 3 of article VII of the NATO SOFA provides that:
In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following
rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or a civilian component in relation to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the
force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance
of official duty.
(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State

shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State
for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such
waiver to be of particular importance.
Id. at 1800.
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official duties or is committed against another member of the vis-

iting force, its civilian component, or a dependent.1 2 1 An equally
important provision promises that each state will give "sympathetic consideration" to a request from the other for a waiver of
its primary right of jurisdiction. The concept of sympathetic consome authorities feel that it
sideration is so widely accepted that 122
law.
international
reflects customary
Paragraph five calls for the sending and receiving states to assist each other in the arrest of members of the force in the territory of the receiving state.1 23 This is of primary importance to the
subject matter of this Note because "[i]t is well established that a
suspect or offender belonging to a force . . does not enjoy any
right of asylum and that the military installations of the sending

State enjoy no extraterritorial privileges.' 1 24 It is significant that
the United States, which is the largest sending state under the
NATO SOFA, has adopted a rather broad policy of cooperation.
Although the language of the NATO SOFA calls only for assistance in the arrest of members of the force in the territory of the
receiving state, the United States has gone further and has long
had a policy of also returning to the custody of the receiving state
accused personnel who had left the territory of the receiving state
pfior to the date when the receiving state began arrest attempts.

121. Hansen v. Hobbs, 22 C.M.A. 181, 46 C.M.R. 181 (1973), suggests that
the sending state's determination that an offense arose out of the accused's official duty may be subject to review in the receiving state's courts. 22 C.M.A. at
182, 46 C.M.R. at 182.
122. See generally Carnahan, supra note 9, at 336; Wijewardane, Criminal
Justice over Visiting Forces with Special Reference to International Forces,
[1965-66] 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 122, 146.
123. Paragraph 5 of article VII of the NATO SOFA provides that:
(a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each
other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their
dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing them

over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
the above provisions.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the mili-

tary authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force
or civilian component or a dependent.'
(c) The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component
over whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in
the hands of the sending State, remain with that State until he is charged
by the receiving State.
NATO SOFA, supra note 6, 4 U.S.T. at 1800.
124. S.LAZAREFF, supra note 16, at 238.
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Cases arising under the provisions of the NATO SOFA and
non-NATO SOFA case law indicate that the United States broad
policy of cooperation, even absent the mandate of the NATO
SOFA, will prompt the United States to return military personnel
who have committed offenses abroad to the receiving nation. The
leading case under the NATO SOFA is Holmes v. Laird,125 a case

involving the arrest of a United States soldier stationed in the
Federal Republic of Germany on charges of attempted rape. Trial
in the district court (Landgerricht) culminated in conviction and
a sentence to imprisonment for three years. The conviction became final after an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof) was denied, and it became the United States
Army's responsibility to turn Holmes over to the Federal Republic. Holmes had absented himself without leave, however, and returned to the United States where he surrendered himself to
Army officials and filed a complaint based on deprivations of
rights allegedly secured to him by the NATO SOFA and by the
due process clause of the United States Constitution. Holmes
asked for an injunction restraining the Army from surrendering
him to the Federal Republic of Germany. The district court had
held that even if Holmes' allegations regarding the lack of due
process were proven, it was beyond the power of the judiciary to
order corrective action. 126 In affirming the district court, the court

of appeals said that matters "vitally and intricately interwoven
with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations . . . are so exclusively

entrusted to the political

branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 127 The court of appeals, citing Wilson v.
Girardand Reid v. Covert,128 reasoned that the locus of the crime
in the Federal Republic of Germany entitled that nation to exclusive jurisdiction. Holmes' citizenship in the United States did not
give him immunity to commit crimes in Germany, nor did it entitle him to a trial in any other mode than that allowed by the
country whose law he violated. Holmes was returned to the Federal Republic of Germany to serve his sentence.
125. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
126. Id. at 1215.
127. Id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)).
128. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
15 n.29, 48-49 (1957).
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Williams v. Rogers12 is a leading non-NATO case in which an
airman stationed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines awaiting
trial for the forcible abduction and attempted rape of an unmarried female Philippine national was inadvertently transferred to
the United States. This transfer directly violated paragraph five
of article XIII of the Military Bases in the Philippines Agreement. 30 Citing due process violations similar to those alleged in
the Holmes case, Sergeant Williams sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Air Force from transferring him back to the Philippines. 131 The district court ruled the airman eligible for immediate transfer. On appeal, the court ruled that the Military Bases in
the Philippines Agreement, authorized by a joint resolution of the
Congress, gave the President broad powers to acquire military bases and to negotiate necessary jurisdictional arrangements implicit in the use of such bases.' It was in the interest of the
United States for Sergeant Williams to remain on Clark Air Base
pending the final disposition of the Philippine proceedings
against him and that benefit produced a concomitant obligation
to report to the Philippine authorities when required to do so.""
The court found that since the case did not involve criminal
charges under United States law in the courts of the United
States, guarantees embodied in the United States Constitution
did not apply. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari,"3 Sergeant Williams was returned to the Philippines.
A second important non-NATO case was brought the following
year in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin. Stark v. Seamans3 5 involved an airman charged

with serious drug offenses in Taichung City, Taiwan, who sought
an order enjoining the Secretary of the Air Force from transferring him to Chinese custody and compelling the Secretary to
129. 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1971).
130. Mar. 14, 1947, United States-Philippines, 61 Stat. 4019, Criminal Juris-

diction Arrangements Exchange of Notes, Aug. 10, 1965, United States-Philippines, art. XIII, 16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851. This agreement allowed the

United States to retain custody of military personnel accused of committing a
crime in the Philippines pending final judgment, but required that the United

States produce such persons for Philippine punishment after final judgment.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

449 F.2d 513, 516 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1971).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
405 U.S. 926 (1971).
339 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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transport him to the continental United States. The court held
that since the defendant's alleged misconduct did not arise in the
performance of his official duties, and since the Status of Forces
Agreement gave the Republic of China exclusive criminal jurisdiction in this type of case, the United States was obliged to surrender him to the Chinese authorities. Under the precedents of The
Schooner Exchange and Wilson v. Girard,the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the Republic of China in the Republic of ChinaUnited States Status of Forces Agreement was a lawful act of the
executive branch.136 Starks was surrendered immediately, to
stand trial in a Chinese court.
It is readily apparent from the case law that service members
will be returned to the justice of the receiving state in situations
in which the United States armed forces have jurisdiction under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice over service members who
are accused of criminal acts against local nationals in foreign
lands where they are stationed under status of forces agreements
which occur outside the performance of official duties. This is
true even if the service members have subsequently been transferred or have absented themselves to the continental United
States.3 7
C. Due Process Rights of an Accused
All developed legal systems recognize that a- person should not
136.

Id. at 1201.

137. In addition to researching the case law in this area, the author has extensively discussed this issue with Judge Advocate General Officers at Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, D.C.; Department of International Law Studies, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.;
International Law Division, United States Army Judge Advocate General
School, Charlottesville, Va.; 412th Engineer Command, Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany; Third United States Air Force, RAF Mildenhall Air Force
Base, United Kingdom, 21st Support Command, Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany; and Headquarters United States Army-Europe and Seventh
United States Army, Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany. After thorough
discussions of the NATO SOFA and other status of forces agreements, none of
these Judge Advocate General Officers were of the opinion that a service member who had been transferred out of the receiving state would be immune from
an immediate transfer back to the receiving state to answer criminal charges
under the laws of the receiving state. This is limited, of course, to situations in
which the service member is still subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
United States military forces.
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be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. 8s Nevertheless,
customary international law does not prohibit two or more nations from punishing an individual for the same offense if each
has prescriptive jurisdiction over the offense and enforcement jurisdiction over the accused. 139 In order to form a protective barrier against most forms of double jeopardy, the NATO SOFA provides that an accused may not be tried by both the sending and
the receiving states unless the crime involved a violation of the
1 40
disciplinary rules of the force.

Due process is also assured in other provisions of the NATO
SOFA. The NATO SOFA and many of the other status of forces
agreements to which the United States is party also enumerate
procedural rights to which an accused "shall be entitled.' ' 4 1 This
implies that the NATO SOFA creates rights for individual persons, but the Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
138. See Oehler, Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments and Their En-

forcement, 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261 (M. Bassiouni &
V. Nanda eds. 1973).
139. Id.; cf. United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978).
140. Paragraph 8 of article VII of the NATO SOFA provides in part:
Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provision of
this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or
has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offense within
the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party.
NATO SOFA, supra note 6, 4 U.S.T. at 1802.
141. Paragraph 9 of article VII of the NATO SOFA provides that:
When a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges
against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if
they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have
free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the
time being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial.
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Carter142 announced that the NATO SOFA "confers no individual rights and most assuredly seeks only to preserve those protections presently existing."14 The court then listed the procedural
rights contained in paragraph nine, article VII of the NATO
SOFA as being "preserved" rather than "created" rights."" During the- initial negotiations the other NATO powers had acquiesced in United States proposals that specific rights be guaranteed to members of visiting forces, since all parties realized that
the United States would be the principal sending state under the

SOFA. For this reason, the "due process" portion of the SOFA
seeks to "preserve specifically United Siates due process rights,
as those rights were understood in 19492145
V. THREE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

IN THE HYPOTHETICAL

CASE

A hypothetical case involving a member of the Army National
Guard accused of homicide while serving on a short tour of duty
in the United Kingdom was discussed earlier in this Note,,along
with three possible courses of action for military authorities. As a
guardsman, the captain is on "Title Thirty-Two state status"' 46
while in his home state. As a result of his "state status," until he
is transferred to Title Ten federal status1 47 he is not subject to
142.

16 C.M.A. 277, 36 C.M.R. 433 (1966).

143. 16 C.M.A. at 281, 36 C.M.R. at 437.
144. 16 C.M.A. at 282, 36 C.M.R. at 438.
145.

NAVAL

Snee, NATO Agreements on Status: Travaux Preparatoires54 U.S.
WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 165 (1961). See

generally Carna-

han, supra note 9, at 347-49.
146. The training and pay status of the Army National Guard is authorized
by 32 U.S.C.A. § 502 (Supp. 1981). This training normally consists of twelve
weekend assemblies at a hometown National Guard Armory and fifteen days of
annual training at a nearby military reservation. Guard units train with active
Army doctrine, equipment, and pay under a state organization headed by the
state Adjutant General and with the assistance of active Army advisor personnel. Although it is a, Reserve component of the United States Army, a Guard
unit is wholly a state organization and is available to the governor for use in civil
emergencies until it is "federalized."
147. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-935 (1976). Section
802 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice states that the Code applies to
members of a regular component of the armed forces and to members of a reserve component while they are on inactive duty training and authorized by
written orders voluntarily accepted.
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice,148 the orders of the United
States Army, or to the orders of the President. While on "state
status" he is legally a member of a state, as opposed to federal,
force. His commander-in-chief is the governor of his home state.
While the guardsman is on his regular active federal training,
however, he is subject to the Uniform Code of Military' Justice
and his commander-in-chief is the President of the United States.
Assume that the National Guard captain has been transferred
to Title Ten federal status for his regular two weeks of annual

training. He has been sent to the United Kingdom as a part of a
three-man war planning cell. While in Liverpool, he becomes involved in an altercation with an English national who later disappears. The captain completes his two-week tour of duty, returns
to his home town, and reverts to "state status." It is only at this
point that British police authorities learn that the national was
killed in the altercation and locate two witnesses who agree to
testify that they saw the captain commit the murder.
A. Applicability of the UCMJ in the Hypothetical Case
Each of the courses of action available to military authorities
requires an analysis of the prerequisites that must exist before
that course can be pursued. The first option is to bring the captain to trial for murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 149 Before deciding whether the UCMJ applies, a

court must first consider whether the United States or the United
Kingdom has jurisdiction over such an offense since the UCMJ
would be applicable only if the United States had jurisdiction. In
the United Kingdom, treaties are not the "law of the land" and
do not become operative in domestic law until implemented by
passage of an act of Parliament. The NATO SOFA was implemented by the Visiting Forces Act, 1952.150 The operative section
148. Transfer of the National Guard into the active Army for periods of federal service is authorized by 10 U.S.C.A. § 672 (Supp. 1981). This may occur
when an entire unit is called into federal service by the President in time of

national emergency. If a single guardsman is called to a tour of duty outside the
continental United States, he is customarily called into federal service under
Title Ten so that virtually all military personnel abroad serve under a similar
legal status. Guardsmen become subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice
when they are on federal duty with the active Army under written orders voluntarily accepted by them. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(3) (Supp. 1981).
149. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. § 918 (Supp. 1981).

150. 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 67.
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of the Visiting Forces Act is quite similar to paragraph three, arti-

cle VII of the NATO SOFA.151 Under both formulations, the only
likely situation in which the United States would have exclusive

jurisdiction would occur when the murdered man was also a
member of the United States force serving in the United King-

dom. Only in this situation would a court reach the issue of the
applicability of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Unfortunately, our hypothetical guardsman cannot be subjected to the Uniform Code of Military Justice because, as the
facts of this case indicate, he returned to the United States and
reverted to "Title Thirty-Two state status ' 15 2 at the end of his
two-week annual training tour of duty. He is no longer under the

jurisdiction of the United States Army and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. As a member of a state body of a reserve component of the United States Army, he may only be ordered to inactive duty training or Title Ten federal status" 3 "on written orders
voluntarily accepted '154 by him, or in time of national emergency
when the President calls his entire unit into "Title Ten federal
151. Subject to the provisions of this section, a person charged with an
offense against United Kingdom law shall not be liable to be tried for that
offense by a United Kingdom court if at the time when the offense is alleged to have been committed he was a member of a visiting force or a
member of a civilian component of such a force and(a) the alleged offense, if committed by him, arose out of and in the
course of his duty as a member of that force or component, as the case
may be; or
(b) the alleged offense is an offense against the person, and the person
or, if more than one, each of the persons in relation to whom it is alleged
to have been committed had at the time thereof a relevant association
whether with that force or with another force of the same country; or
(c) the alleged offense is an offense against property, and the whole of
the property in relation to which it is alleged to have been committed (or,
in a case where different parts of that property were differently owned,
each part of the property) was at the time thereof the property either of

the sending country or of an authority of that country or of a person having such an association as aforesaid:
Provided that this subsection shall not apply if at the time when the
offense is alleged to have been committed the alleged offender was a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the service courts of the country in
question in accordance with the last foregoing section.

Id. § 3.
152.
153.

32 U.S.C.A. § 502 (Supp. 1981); see note 146 supra.
10 U.S.C.A. § 802(3) (Supp. 1981); see note 148 supra.

154. Id.
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status." A national emergency is not a-part of the hypothetical
problem, and it is inconceivable that the guardsman would voluntarily consent to being returned to federal service in order that he
might answer to a court-martial for the crime of murder. So the
first option of applying the Uniform Code of Military Justice is
foreclosed as a possible course of action in the hypothetical
situation.
B. Applicability of the NATO SOFA to the Hypothetical
Case
The second option in our hypothetical case is for the Army to
order the accused to return to the United Kingdom to stand trial
in the courts of that nation, in accordance with the precedents in
157
Wilson v. Girard,155 Reid v. Covert,1 56 Holmes v. Laird, Williams v. Rogers,1 58 and Stark v. Seamans. 59 If the murdered man
was a citizen of the United Kingdom, then paragraph 3(b), article
VII of the NATO SOFA grants the primary right to exercise jurisdiction to the United Kingdom. Additionally, under section three
of the United Kingdom's Visiting Forces Act, United Kingdom
courts would also have domestic authority for jurisdiction over
the accused. Thus there is no doubt that these precedents absolutely obligate the United States Army to return the guardsman
to stand trial in Liverpool before Her Majesty's court.
Unfortunately, the Army once again lacks the necessary in personam jurisdiction to return the guardsman to England because
the accused is no longer under Title Ten federal status and is
totally beyond the reach of United States military justice. Unless
the guardsman voluntarily consents to being recalled to active
duty, or unless a national emergency aries which requires the
President to call the accused's entire National Guard unit into
Title Ten federal status, the United States Army cannot fulfill its
obligation to the United Kingdom under the NATO SOFA.
Again, it is inconceivable that such an accused would voluntarily

consent to being returned to federal service so that he might
stand before the Queen's Court in Liverpool for the crime of murder. Thus the direct applicability of the NATO SOFA through
155. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).

156. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
157. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
158. 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1971).
159. 339 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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the United States Army is foreclosed as a possibility.
C.

Applicability of the Extradition Treaty

The third option in our hypothetical case involved action by
the Government of the United States (as distinguished from the
United States Army) under the terms of the United
States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty 6 0 to return the accused to British justice. This process would be totally separate
from the military context of either the Uniform Code of Military
Justice or the NATO SOFA. While the existence of the SOFA

might create a general feeling of obligation on the part of United
States officials to return the guardsman, since the SOFA would
not apply the accused would be treated as any civilian whose extradition was requested by the United Kingdom.
Extradition occurs when "persons charged with or convicted of
crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are
returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment." 16 1, It
is an extremely technical process requiring precision and cooperation between two sovereign systems that often exhibit different
fundamental legal theory and procedure. Extradition enables
states to surrender fugitive criminals to one another without diminishing either party's sovereignty, without demeaning either
party's institutions of criminal justice, and without violating the
traditional rights of the accused fugitive. This is a difficult task,
and the rejection of an extradition request with the concomitant
failure of the extradition process may be perceived as an insult to
162
the requesting state's judicial system.
1.

Extradition Principles

Extradition in the United States is solely the prerogative of the
federal government 6 3 and not a power of the several states of the
Union.6 4 In an early landmark case, United States v. Rau-

160. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7.

161. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 727.
162. See Blakesley, ExtraditionBetween Franceand the United States: An
Exercise in Comparative and InternationalLaw, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
653, 655-56 (1980).

163. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10.
164. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 727.
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0 5 the Supreme
scher,1
Court laid down the basic principles governing extradition:

It is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the States where their crimes were committed,
for trial and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties
by one independent government with another. Prior to these treaties, and apart from them, it may be stated as the general result of
the writers upon international law, that there was no well defined
obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to another,
and though such delivery was often made, it was upon the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the government whose
action was invoked; and it has never been recognized as among
those obligations of one government towards another which rest
upon established principles of international law.168
1 67
And in Factorv. Laubenheimer,
the Court further defined the
concept of extradition:

[T]he principles of international law recognize no right to extradite
apart from treaty. While a government may, if agreeable to its own
constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise the power to surrender a
fugitive from justice to the country from which he has fled, and it
has been said that it is under a moral duty to do so. . . the legal
right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding country exist only when created by
treaty."6 8
The Court went further in 1936 and held that not only is there no
duty to extradite apart from a duty under a specific treaty, but
there is also no authority in United States law to extradite short
of an express legislative or treaty stipulation. 6 9
Applying, as we must, our law in determining the authority of the
President, we are constrained to hold that his power, in the absence of a statute conferring an independent power, must be found
in the terms of the treaty and that, as the treaty with France fails
to grant the necessary authority, the President is without power to
170
surrender the respondent.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

119 U.S. 407 (1886).
Id.
290 U.S. 276 (1933).
Id. at 287.
Blakesley, supra note 162, at 659.

170. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 18 (1936).
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In the United States, treaties are the "law of the land," and implementing legislation is not necessary for extradition treaties,
which are generally self-executing. A fugitive may be arrested
under the terms of the agreement alone, even absent enabling legislation. 17 1 While statutes have been enacted relating to extradition, these laws do not authorize extradition apart from treaty.

The operation of these statutes and the authority they confer are
dependent on the existence of an extradition treaty with a foreign
government. 17 2 In Valentine v. United States,7 3 the Court said

that the compelling reason for judicial refusal to grant extradition
without treaty authority is the
fundamental consideration that the Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceedings against him must be authorized by law. There is no executive
discretion to surrender him to a foreign government, unless that
discretion is granted by law.... Legal authority does not exist,

save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty
174

A similar inability to grant extradition in the absence of a treaty
exists in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's law authorizing extradition may be applied only "[w]here an arrangement
has been made with any foreign state with respect to the surrender to such state of any fugitive criminals.'" 75 Fortunately for the
military authorities in the hypothetical case, the United StatesUnited Kingdom Extradition Treaty17 1 clearly charts the course
of action necessary to extradite the guardsman.
The Department of State exerts powerful influence on judicial
interpretations of the validity and application of treaty provisions
since the courts often rely on executive expertise to resolve these
issues. This reliance is a natural outgrowth of the executive power
to conduct foreign affairs.'7 Where doubts exist as to the mean-

171. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (West Supp. 1980); see M. WHITEMAN, supra note
110, at 734.
172. In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 188 (1847).
173. 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
174. Id. at 9.
175. Extradition Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52, § 2.
176. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7.
177. See Blakesley, supra note 162, at 661; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFmRS AND
THE CONSTITUTON (1972); Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers:
The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959).
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ing of certain provisions, a construction consistently applied by

the Department of State is of great weight. 17 8
Many extradition treaties contain a provision that neither of

the contracting parties shall be bound to surrender its own citizens. 7 9 Even the Greek city states, the ancient Italian cities, and
other great civilizations exempted their citizens from extradi-

tion. 180 In situations in which a treaty has thus limited extradition, the United States Supreme Court has held that the exemption of nationals creates an absolute bar to the extradition of
United States citizens. 181 The policy preference of the United
States Government is to extradite fugitives regardless of nationality.182 There are four differing approaches used in its extradition

treaties, however. The first, exemplified by the 1909 Extradition
Treaty between the United States and France, 18 3 provides that

the parties are not bound to extradite their nationals. This completely and absolutely bars extradition from the United States.
The second approach, which was adopted by the 1970 Extradition

Treaty between the United States and France,1 does not involve
an express obligation to extradite nationals. The President is expressly given discretionary authority to extradite nationals on a

case-by-case basis. The third approach is exemplified by the
United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty of 1931185

which remains silent on the subject of extradition of nationals.
178. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933); Charleton v. Kelly,
229 U.S. 447, 468 (1913).
179. Of the 163 extradition treaties printed in the League of Nations Treaty
Series and the first 550 volumes of the United Nations Treaty Series, 98 treaties
relieve the requested state from extradition duty, 57 give the requested state a
discretionary right to refuse to surrender its own nationals, and only 8 provide
for extradition regardless of the nationality of the fugitive. I. SHEARER, ExTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24, 96, app. 11 (1971).
180. See Blakesley, supra note 162, at 690.
181. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1936). The power to extradite must be specifically granted in the extradition treaty, and where there is no
positive statement a negative phrase cannot be construed as a grant of power to
the President. Id. at 10.
182. See Blakesley, supra note 162, at 692.
183. Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, 37 Stat. 1526,
T.S. No. 561.
184. Proclamation on Extradition, Feb. 12, 1970, United States-France, 22
U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075.
185. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, United States-United Kingdom, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849.
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The fourth, exemplified by the present United States-United
Kingdom Extradition Treaty, expressly provides for extradition
without regard to nationality.186 Therefore, the United States is
able to maintain its policy of extraditing its own nationals, while
expecting the United Kingdom to reciprocate.
2. Terms of the Treaty
Article III of the current United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty1 7 provides that extradition shall be granted for an
offense listed in the schedule18s annexed to the Treaty only if the
offense is punishable 189 under the laws of both countries by imprisonment for more than one year or by death and constitutes a
felony under the laws of the United States. In Collins v. Loisel l 1
the Supreme Court had made it plain that "an offense is extraditable only if the acts charged are criminal by the laws of both
countries,"1 90 and crimes which the United States holds to be
felonies such as murder, manslaughter, and maliciously wounding
or inflicting grievous bodily harm, are the first three offenses
listed on the schedule.
Most extradition treaties exempt certain types of offenses even
when these offenses otherwise would constitute extraditable offenses. While these exemptions do not apply to the instant hypo186. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7. Article I provides that

"each contracting Party undertakes to extradite to the other, in the circumstances and subject to the conditions specified in this Treaty, any person found

in its territory who has been accused or convicted of any offense within Article
HI, committed within the jurisdiction of the other Party." Id., 28 U.S.T. at 229
(emphasis added); Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United StatesIsrael, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476.
187. See Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7, 28 U.S.T. at 229.

188. Id. at 235.
189. The principle of speciality requires that a fugitive returned to a requesting nation through extradition proceedings be tried only for the offense for
which he was extradited. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). Before

he may be tried for additional offenses committed before his extradition, he
must be released from custody and allowed to leave the country. This principle

is addressed in article XH of the Treaty of Extradition, which provides that
before a person who is extradited may be prosecuted for a "new" offense com-

mitted before his extradition, he must be allowed to return to the territory of
the requested party, or alternatively, he must have thirty days during which he
is free to so return. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7, 28 U.S.T. at 233.
189.1. '259 U.S. 309 (1921).

190. Id. at 311.

220

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.179

thetical, they may be instructive in cases involving a slight variation of the facts found in the hypothetical. Common exemptions
include political, religious, fiscal, and military offenses, although
it is often hard to precisely define these crimes. A good example
of this definitional diffculty is encountered when examining the

political offense. While most treaties grant an exemption when
the act with which the accused is charged is a political offense, a
distinction is usually19 ' drawn between a "purely" political offense such as treason or sedition as opposed to a "relative" political offense such as murder committed in the course of a rebellion.
For example, under a Norwegian law both purely political and
relatively political offenses are excepted from extradition:
"[e]xtradition may not be effected for any political offense, or for
any ordinary offense committed in connection with a political offense and with intent to promote the purpose aimed at by such
political offense."'" 2 In the United States, a Second Circuit decision has held that persons may not be extradited for political offenses. 1 93 The decision whether or not an offense is political is
usually left to the government on which the demand for extradition is made, but in the absence of such a treaty provision the
right to determine this question inheres in the government which
has made the demand.19 4 The political exemption is contained in
article V"9 5 of the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Treaty. In addition, article V of this Treaty bars extradition in
the interest of preventing double jeopardy. Even though a prohibition against the imposition of double jeopardy pervades the internal criminal justice systems of both the United Kingdom and
the United States, in certain previous cases it was possible for a
person to be punished in a foreign nation and then punished
again after extradition. This was possible because, in both the
United Kingdom and the United States, foreign judgments are
not a bar to prosecution, although they may be considered by the

local court

s6

In addition, United States jurisdiction is not lim-

191. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 800.
192. Law of June 13, 1908, § 3 (Norway), Lov om Utlevering av Forbrydere,
quoted in M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 800.
193.

Ex rel. Giletti v. Commissioner of Immigration, 35 F.2d 687, 689 (2d

Cir. 1929).
194. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). See also M. WHITEMAN, supra
note 110, at 859.
195. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7, 28 U.S.T. at 230.
196. In People v. Papaccio, 140 Misc. 696, 251 N.Y.S. 717 (1939), the accused
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ited to crimes committed within the sovereign territory of the
United States. 97 Another important exemption in article V provides that extradition cannot be barred by a statute of limitations
found in the law of the requesting or the requested state. 198 Most
extradition treaties also contain this type of provision, but the
extradition laws of the United States contain no provision with
respect to a statute of limitations. 99 Therefore, if a treaty has no
provision allowing extradition in situations in which the statute of
limitations has run, such as the hypothetical case in which 00 the

United States is the requested state, no limitation of United
States law is applied in the case. A final section of article V provides that "[e]xtradition may be refused on any other ground
which is specified by the law of the requested Party.

' 201

Since

nothing in the fact pattern of the hypothetical indicates that
there will be any difficulty involving a political offense, double
jeopardy, or a statute of limitations, these matters should present
no bar to the extradition of the National Guardsman.
3.

Extradition Procedures

In accordance with article VIP0 of the Treaty, a request for
extradition made by the United Kingdom would normally proceed through diplomatic channels. A British request for extradition of a fugitive located in the United States would initially be
presented to the Department of State, and the Secretary would
make a policy decision as to whether extradition would be in the
best interest of the United States. The twin imperatives of international comity and justice would influence the decision to extradite the fugitive to the United Kingdom.203 If the Secretary of
State decides to proceed with the matter, he will issue a "preliminary mandate" to the Department of Justice certifying that the
United Kingdom has made a formal request for the arrest of the
was prosecuted although he had already been convicted by an Italian court for a

crime committed in New York.
197. See Blakesley, supra note 162, at 695.
198. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7, 28 U.S.T. at 203.
199. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 864.

200. See Caputo v. Kelly, 96 F.2d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1938).
201. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7, 28 U.S.T. at 230.
202. Id. at 231.
203. Letter to the author from Rex L. Young, Office of International Affairs,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice (April 29, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Young Letter].
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accused and requesting "any Justice . .. , Judge . .. , or . . .
Commissioner" 2 4 to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Through the efforts of the Department of Justice20 5 a warrant is
then issued by a court after a complaint made under oath has
been filed along with the preliminary mandate. The alleged fugi2°
tive may then be arrested and detained pending his hearing. 0
According to paragraph 2 of article VII of the Treaty, the original extradition request from the United Kingdom must include
the identity of the accused, a statement of the facts of the offense,
the text of the applicable law, the maximum punishment and

statute of limitations, and a statement of the legal provisions
which establish the extraditable character of the offense.20 7 In addition, there must be a copy of such evidence as would justify
trial if the offense had occured within the United States, evidence
that the accused is indeed the person named in the warrant, and
a copy of the British warrant for the arrest of the accused. 208 Finally, the request must be sealed with the official seal of the appropriate minister of the Government of the United Kingdom
and certified by the United States Ambassador to the United
Kingdom.20 0 In the United States, the judicial assistance in the
initial decision to extradite occurs at a public2 10 hearing conducted by "any justice or judge of the United States, or any commissioner authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or
any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction by any state
....
,,211 It is the function of the extradition magistrate at the
hearing to determine whether the requested state has presented a
proper case for the accused's extradition. This hearing process
involves:
determining whether the person brought before him is the person
who is named in the extradition request and its supporting documents, whether a valid treaty exists between the requesting State
and the United States, whether the evidence presented either
shows that the accused has been convicted in the requesting State
204. M.
Mandate).

WHITEMAN,

supra note 110, at 916-17 (form for Preliminary

205. Young Letter, supra note 203.
206. Id.
207. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 7, 28 U.S.T. at 231.
3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
5, 28 U.S.T. at 231-32.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3189 (1976). These hearings are usually public.
211. Id. § 3184.
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of committing, or establishes probable cause, or reasonable ground,
to believe that the accused committed, acts constituting an offense
named in the treaty. It may also involve determination whether
any of the prohibitions mentioned in the applicable treaty exists
(e.g., national of the requested State, offense2 12of a political character, or prosecution barred by lapse of time).
The extradition magistrate need not find that the accused is in
fact guilty of the crime with which he is charged; it is only necessary that the evidence2 13 be heard and considered so that the
magistrate may determine whether "he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty."2 1 The extradition magistrate will commit the accused for
surrender to the requesting state only if the evidence against the
fugitive would have been sufficient to justify commitment of the
accused for trial had the offense been committed in the United
States. The Supreme Court has likened this process to one of
those preliminary examinations which take place every day in this
country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose of determining whether a case is made out which will justify
the holding of the accused, either by imprisonment or under bail,
to ultimately answer to an indictment, or other proceeding, in
which
he shall be finally tried .upon the charge made against
2 15
hi.

While habeas corpus proceedings permit some limited review of
the decision of an extradition magistrate, there is no appeal to
any court from such a decision whether that decision be to commit the accused for surrender or to refuse to do so. 216 Similarly,
there is no provision for bail within the extradition laws of the
United States.2 1
Once the extradition magistrate has decided to commit the accused for surrender to the requesting state, the process of surrender becomes an executive function exercised by the Secretary of
212. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 944-45.
213. If there are witnesses whose testimony is material to the defense of the
accused and he is without funds to pay them, they will be paid in the same
manner as those subpoenaed on behalf of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3191
(1976).
214. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 291 n.3 (1933).
215. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1887).
216. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
217. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 110, at 1035.
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State.2 1 8 The Executive is not required to surrender the accused

merely because the extradition magistrate made a permissive judicial determination in favor of extradition. It is only after the
Secretary of State issues a "warrant for surrender" that the
United States marshall for the district in which the fugitive is
held is authorized to deliver the fugitive to any duly authorized
representative of the requesting government.219
Our hypothetical guardsman is present within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States Government. The facts of this case
do not indicate that there is any chance he Will benefit from an
exemption. Certain procedural safeguards from the extradition
rules protect the guardsman during the extradition hearing and
later, should there be a habeas corpus hearing. Since the United
States and the United Kingdom have an announced policy of extraditing fugitives regardless of nationality, the guardsman would
be surrendered to the Government of the United Kingdom to
stand trial for murder.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the facts of the hypothetical case, the Secretary of State

undoubtedly would feel a moral obligation, engendered by the
spirit and intent of the NATO SOFA, to extradite a guardsman
accused by the United Kingdom of murder. From the British
point of view, the guardsman was a member of the NATO visiting
force in the United Kingdom when the crime occurred, and the
fact that two weeks later he was not subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of the United States Army and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice would be a distinction without substance.
The procedures specified under the United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty could and would be used as an effective
means of returning such a fugitive to stand trial for the crime of
murder. This Treaty negates the significance of the law of the flag
embodied in the absolute or classical theory of foreign sovereign
immunity prior to the twentieth century, rendering that law inapplicable in this case. Under the modern theory of restrictive sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign would be recognized with regard to sovereign or official public acts (jure imperii)
but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) such as an
218. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3185-3186 (1976).
219. M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 110, at 1046.
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alleged off-duty murder. 220 Restrictive sovereign immunity, coupled with territorial sovereignty, would be the operative principles in achieving justice in this hypothetical case involving the
law of the flag, the law of extradition, the Uniform Code of Miltary Justice, and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
Fred W. Beesley, Jr.

220. Id. at 553.

